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zfs-builds-mm/zfs-0.8.4/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c

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add_new_zfs
2020-07-19 16:21:53 +02:00
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0.
* You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version
* 1.0 of the CDDL.
*
* A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this
* source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at
* http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL.
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2018 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <sys/dsl_crypt.h>
#include <sys/dsl_pool.h>
#include <sys/zap.h>
#include <sys/zil.h>
#include <sys/dsl_dir.h>
#include <sys/dsl_prop.h>
#include <sys/spa_impl.h>
#include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
#include <sys/zvol.h>
/*
* This file's primary purpose is for managing master encryption keys in
* memory and on disk. For more info on how these keys are used, see the
* block comment in zio_crypt.c.
*
* All master keys are stored encrypted on disk in the form of the DSL
* Crypto Key ZAP object. The binary key data in this object is always
* randomly generated and is encrypted with the user's wrapping key. This
* layer of indirection allows the user to change their key without
* needing to re-encrypt the entire dataset. The ZAP also holds on to the
* (non-encrypted) encryption algorithm identifier, IV, and MAC needed to
* safely decrypt the master key. For more info on the user's key see the
* block comment in libzfs_crypto.c
*
* In-memory encryption keys are managed through the spa_keystore. The
* keystore consists of 3 AVL trees, which are as follows:
*
* The Wrapping Key Tree:
* The wrapping key (wkey) tree stores the user's keys that are fed into the
* kernel through 'zfs load-key' and related commands. Datasets inherit their
* parent's wkey by default, so these structures are refcounted. The wrapping
* keys remain in memory until they are explicitly unloaded (with
* "zfs unload-key"). Unloading is only possible when no datasets are using
* them (refcount=0).
*
* The DSL Crypto Key Tree:
* The DSL Crypto Keys (DCK) are the in-memory representation of decrypted
* master keys. They are used by the functions in zio_crypt.c to perform
* encryption, decryption, and authentication. Snapshots and clones of a given
* dataset will share a DSL Crypto Key, so they are also refcounted. Once the
* refcount on a key hits zero, it is immediately zeroed out and freed.
*
* The Crypto Key Mapping Tree:
* The zio layer needs to lookup master keys by their dataset object id. Since
* the DSL Crypto Keys can belong to multiple datasets, we maintain a tree of
* dsl_key_mapping_t's which essentially just map the dataset object id to its
* appropriate DSL Crypto Key. The management for creating and destroying these
* mappings hooks into the code for owning and disowning datasets. Usually,
* there will only be one active dataset owner, but there are times
* (particularly during dataset creation and destruction) when this may not be
* true or the dataset may not be initialized enough to own. As a result, this
* object is also refcounted.
*/
/*
* This tunable allows datasets to be raw received even if the stream does
* not include IVset guids or if the guids don't match. This is used as part
* of the resolution for ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_8308_ENCRYPTION.
*/
int zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check = 0;
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
{
(void) zfs_refcount_add(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
}
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
{
(void) zfs_refcount_remove(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
}
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
{
ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&wkey->wk_refcnt));
if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
}
zfs_refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
kmem_free(wkey, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t));
}
static int
dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat,
uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
/* allocate the wrapping key */
wkey = kmem_alloc(sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!wkey)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOMEM));
/* allocate and initialize the underlying crypto key */
wkey->wk_key.ck_data = kmem_alloc(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, KM_SLEEP);
if (!wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
/* initialize the rest of the struct */
zfs_refcount_create(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
wkey->wk_salt = salt;
wkey->wk_iters = iters;
*wkey_out = wkey;
return (0);
error:
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
int
dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(dcp_cmd_t cmd, nvlist_t *props,
nvlist_t *crypto_args, dsl_crypto_params_t **dcp_out)
{
int ret;
uint64_t crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT;
uint64_t keyformat = ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE;
uint64_t salt = 0, iters = 0;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
uint8_t *wkeydata = NULL;
uint_t wkeydata_len = 0;
char *keylocation = NULL;
dcp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!dcp) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM);
goto error;
}
dcp->cp_cmd = cmd;
/* get relevant arguments from the nvlists */
if (props != NULL) {
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), &crypt);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), &keyformat);
(void) nvlist_lookup_string(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), &keylocation);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), &salt);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), &iters);
dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
}
if (crypto_args != NULL) {
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata",
&wkeydata, &wkeydata_len);
}
/* check for valid command */
if (dcp->cp_cmd >= DCP_CMD_MAX) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
} else {
dcp->cp_cmd = cmd;
}
/* check for valid crypt */
if (dcp->cp_crypt >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
} else {
dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
}
/* check for valid keyformat */
if (keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check for a valid keylocation (of any kind) and copy it in */
if (keylocation != NULL) {
if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_FALSE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
dcp->cp_keylocation = spa_strdup(keylocation);
}
/* check wrapping key length, if given */
if (wkeydata != NULL && wkeydata_len != WRAPPING_KEY_LEN) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* if the user asked for the default crypt, determine that now */
if (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_ON)
dcp->cp_crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_ON_VALUE;
/* create the wrapping key from the raw data */
if (wkeydata != NULL) {
/* create the wrapping key with the verified parameters */
ret = dsl_wrapping_key_create(wkeydata, keyformat, salt,
iters, &wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dcp->cp_wkey = wkey;
}
/*
* Remove the encryption properties from the nvlist since they are not
* maintained through the DSL.
*/
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
*dcp_out = dcp;
return (0);
error:
if (wkey != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
if (dcp != NULL)
kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
*dcp_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
void
dsl_crypto_params_free(dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, boolean_t unload)
{
if (dcp == NULL)
return;
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
spa_strfree(dcp->cp_keylocation);
if (unload && dcp->cp_wkey != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(dcp->cp_wkey);
kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
}
static int
spa_crypto_key_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_crypto_key_t *dcka = a;
const dsl_crypto_key_t *dckb = b;
if (dcka->dck_obj < dckb->dck_obj)
return (-1);
if (dcka->dck_obj > dckb->dck_obj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
static int
spa_key_mapping_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_key_mapping_t *kma = a;
const dsl_key_mapping_t *kmb = b;
if (kma->km_dsobj < kmb->km_dsobj)
return (-1);
if (kma->km_dsobj > kmb->km_dsobj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
static int
spa_wkey_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wka = a;
const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkb = b;
if (wka->wk_ddobj < wkb->wk_ddobj)
return (-1);
if (wka->wk_ddobj > wkb->wk_ddobj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
void
spa_keystore_init(spa_keystore_t *sk)
{
rw_init(&sk->sk_dk_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
rw_init(&sk->sk_km_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
rw_init(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
avl_create(&sk->sk_dsl_keys, spa_crypto_key_compare,
sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t),
offsetof(dsl_crypto_key_t, dck_avl_link));
avl_create(&sk->sk_key_mappings, spa_key_mapping_compare,
sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t),
offsetof(dsl_key_mapping_t, km_avl_link));
avl_create(&sk->sk_wkeys, spa_wkey_compare, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t),
offsetof(dsl_wrapping_key_t, wk_avl_link));
}
void
spa_keystore_fini(spa_keystore_t *sk)
{
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
void *cookie = NULL;
ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_dsl_keys));
ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_key_mappings));
while ((wkey = avl_destroy_nodes(&sk->sk_wkeys, &cookie)) != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_key_mappings);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_dsl_keys);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_km_lock);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_dk_lock);
}
static int
dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *rddobj)
{
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, rddobj));
}
int
dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *version)
{
*version = 0;
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
/* version 0 is implied by ENOENT */
(void) zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, version);
return (0);
}
boolean_t
dsl_dir_incompatible_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
int ret;
uint64_t version = 0;
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dd, &version);
if (ret != 0)
return (B_FALSE);
return (version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION);
}
static int
spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj,
void *tag, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
/* init the search wrapping key */
search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
/* lookup the wrapping key */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &search_wkey, NULL);
if (!found_wkey) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error;
}
/* increment the refcount */
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(found_wkey, tag);
*wkey_out = found_wkey;
return (0);
error:
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
uint64_t rddobj;
boolean_t locked = B_FALSE;
if (!RW_WRITE_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)) {
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_READER);
locked = B_TRUE;
}
/* get the ddobj that the keylocation property was inherited from */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* lookup the wkey in the avl tree */
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa, rddobj, tag, &wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* unlock the wkey tree if we locked it */
if (locked)
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
*wkey_out = wkey;
return (0);
error:
if (locked)
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
int
dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation)
{
int ret = 0;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
uint64_t rddobj;
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* if dd is not encrypted, the value may only be "none" */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
if (strcmp(keylocation, "none") != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* check for a valid keylocation for encrypted datasets */
if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto out;
}
/* check that this is an encryption root */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
if (rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto out;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (0);
out:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_free(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck)
{
ASSERT(zfs_refcount_count(&dck->dck_holds) == 0);
/* destroy the zio_crypt_key_t */
zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck->dck_key);
/* free the refcount, wrapping key, and lock */
zfs_refcount_destroy(&dck->dck_holds);
if (dck->dck_wkey)
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
/* free the key */
kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
{
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0)
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
}
static int
dsl_crypto_key_open(objset_t *mos, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, version = 0;
uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck;
/* allocate and initialize the key */
dck = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!dck)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOMEM));
/* fetch all of the values we need from the ZAP */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &guid);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* the initial on-disk format for encryption did not have a version */
(void) zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
/*
* Unwrap the keys. If there is an error return EACCES to indicate
* an authentication failure.
*/
ret = zio_crypt_key_unwrap(&wkey->wk_key, crypt, version, guid,
raw_keydata, raw_hmac_keydata, iv, mac, &dck->dck_key);
if (ret != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto error;
}
/* finish initializing the dsl_crypto_key_t */
zfs_refcount_create(&dck->dck_holds);
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
dck->dck_obj = dckobj;
zfs_refcount_add(&dck->dck_holds, tag);
*dck_out = dck;
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL) {
bzero(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
}
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dckobj, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t search_dck;
dsl_crypto_key_t *found_dck;
ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock));
/* init the search key */
search_dck.dck_obj = dckobj;
/* find the matching key in the keystore */
found_dck = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, &search_dck, NULL);
if (!found_dck) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error;
}
/* increment the refcount */
zfs_refcount_add(&found_dck->dck_holds, tag);
*dck_out = found_dck;
return (0);
error:
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck_io = NULL, *dck_ks = NULL;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
uint64_t dckobj = dd->dd_crypto_obj;
/* Lookup the key in the tree of currently loaded keys */
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_READER);
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
if (ret == 0) {
*dck_out = dck_ks;
return (0);
}
/* Lookup the wrapping key from the keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, dd, FTAG, &wkey);
if (ret != 0) {
*dck_out = NULL;
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
}
/* Read the key from disk */
ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(spa->spa_meta_objset, wkey, dckobj,
tag, &dck_io);
if (ret != 0) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
/*
* Add the key to the keystore. It may already exist if it was
* added while performing the read from disk. In this case discard
* it and return the key from the keystore.
*/
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
if (ret != 0) {
avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, &where);
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, where);
*dck_out = dck_io;
} else {
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck_io);
*dck_out = dck_ks;
}
/* Release the wrapping key (the dsl key now has a reference to it) */
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
return (0);
}
void
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
{
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) {
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck);
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
}
int
spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
if (found_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EEXIST);
goto error_unlock;
}
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
boolean_t noop)
{
int ret;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
uint64_t rddobj, keyformat, salt, iters;
/*
* We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters
* since they will never be needed after the DCK has been wrapped.
*/
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL ||
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE ||
dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
goto error;
}
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
goto error;
}
/* confirm that dd is the encryption root */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0 || rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* initialize the wkey's ddobj */
wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
/* verify that the wkey is correct by opening its dsl key */
ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(dp->dp_meta_objset, wkey,
dd->dd_crypto_obj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS);
ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE);
IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0);
IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0);
IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0);
IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0);
wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
wkey->wk_salt = salt;
wkey->wk_iters = iters;
/*
* At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can
* be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and
* return if this is all the user wanted to do.
*/
if (noop)
goto error;
/* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
/* create any zvols under this ds */
zvol_create_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
/* init the search wrapping key */
search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* remove the wrapping key from the keystore */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys,
&search_wkey, NULL);
if (!found_wkey) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto error_unlock;
} else if (zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt) != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EBUSY);
goto error_unlock;
}
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
/* free the wrapping key */
dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_unload_wkey(const char *dsname)
{
int ret = 0;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
spa_t *spa = NULL;
ret = spa_open(dsname, &spa, FTAG);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
/*
* Wait for any outstanding txg IO to complete, releasing any
* remaining references on the wkey.
*/
if (spa_mode(spa) != FREAD)
txg_wait_synced(spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0);
spa_close(spa, FTAG);
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
ret = (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
goto error;
}
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
goto error;
}
/* unload the wkey */
ret = spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, dd->dd_object);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
/* remove any zvols under this ds */
zvol_remove_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
return (0);
error:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
void
key_mapping_add_ref(dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
{
ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
}
/*
* The locking here is a little tricky to ensure we don't cause unnecessary
* performance problems. We want to release a key mapping whenever someone
* decrements the refcount to 0, but freeing the mapping requires removing
* it from the spa_keystore, which requires holding sk_km_lock as a writer.
* Most of the time we don't want to hold this lock as a writer, since the
* same lock is held as a reader for each IO that needs to encrypt / decrypt
* data for any dataset and in practice we will only actually free the
* mapping after unmounting a dataset.
*/
void
key_mapping_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
{
ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, tag) != 0)
return;
/*
* We think we are going to need to free the mapping. Add a
* reference to prevent most other releasers from thinking
* this might be their responsibility. This is inherently
* racy, so we will confirm that we are legitimately the
* last holder once we have the sk_km_lock as a writer.
*/
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG);
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG) != 0) {
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
return;
}
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
}
int
spa_keystore_create_mapping(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, void *tag,
dsl_key_mapping_t **km_out)
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_key_mapping_t *km, *found_km;
boolean_t should_free = B_FALSE;
/* Allocate and initialize the mapping */
km = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), KM_SLEEP);
zfs_refcount_create(&km->km_refcnt);
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa, ds->ds_dir, km, &km->km_key);
if (ret != 0) {
zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
km->km_dsobj = ds->ds_object;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
/*
* If a mapping already exists, simply increment its refcount and
* cleanup the one we made. We want to allocate / free outside of
* the lock because this lock is also used by the zio layer to lookup
* key mappings. Otherwise, use the one we created. Normally, there will
* only be one active reference at a time (the objset owner), but there
* are times when there could be multiple async users.
*/
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, &where);
if (found_km != NULL) {
should_free = B_TRUE;
zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_refcnt, tag);
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = found_km;
} else {
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, where);
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = km;
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (should_free) {
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
}
return (0);
}
int
spa_keystore_remove_mapping(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag)
{
int ret;
dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
/* init the search key mapping */
search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
/* find the matching mapping */
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings,
&search_km, NULL);
if (found_km == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error_unlock;
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
key_mapping_rele(spa, found_km, tag);
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
return (ret);
}
/*
* This function is primarily used by the zio and arc layer to lookup
* DSL Crypto Keys for encryption. Callers must release the key with
* spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(). The function may also be called with
* dck_out == NULL and tag == NULL to simply check that a key exists
* without getting a reference to it.
*/
int
spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
ASSERT((tag != NULL && dck_out != NULL) ||
(tag == NULL && dck_out == NULL));
/* init the search key mapping */
search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
/* remove the mapping from the tree */
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, &search_km,
NULL);
if (found_km == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error_unlock;
}
if (found_km && tag)
zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_key->dck_holds, tag);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (dck_out != NULL)
*dck_out = found_km->km_key;
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (dck_out != NULL)
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dd->dd_pool->dp_spa, dd, FTAG,
&wkey);
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
return (0);
}
static zfs_keystatus_t
dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
/* check if this dd has a has a dsl key */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (ZFS_KEYSTATUS_NONE);
return (dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd) == 0 ?
ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE : ZFS_KEYSTATUS_UNAVAILABLE);
}
static int
dsl_dir_get_crypt(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *crypt)
{
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
*crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
return (0);
}
return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, crypt));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(objset_t *mos, uint64_t dckobj, uint64_t crypt,
uint64_t root_ddobj, uint64_t guid, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac,
uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint64_t keyformat,
uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
&root_ddobj, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1,
&guid, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, keydata, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, hmac_keydata, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
8, 1, &keyformat, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
8, 1, &salt, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
8, 1, &iters, tx));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_sync(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
zio_crypt_key_t *key = &dck->dck_key;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dck->dck_wkey;
uint8_t keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
ASSERT3U(key->zk_crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
/* encrypt and store the keys along with the IV and MAC */
VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_wrap(&dck->dck_wkey->wk_key, key, iv, mac,
keydata, hmac_keydata));
/* update the ZAP with the obtained values */
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck->dck_obj,
key->zk_crypt, wkey->wk_ddobj, key->zk_guid, iv, mac, keydata,
hmac_keydata, wkey->wk_keyformat, wkey->wk_salt, wkey->wk_iters,
tx);
}
typedef struct spa_keystore_change_key_args {
const char *skcka_dsname;
dsl_crypto_params_t *skcka_cp;
} spa_keystore_change_key_args_t;
static int
spa_keystore_change_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
uint64_t rddobj;
/* check for the encryption feature */
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
goto error;
}
/* check for valid key change command */
if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_INHERIT &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* hold the dd */
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
goto error;
}
/* verify that the dataset is encrypted */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* clones must always use their origin's key */
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* lookup the ddobj we are inheriting the keylocation from */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* Handle inheritance */
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
/* no other encryption params should be given */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that this is an encryption root */
if (dd->dd_object != rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that the parent is encrypted */
if (dd->dd_parent->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* if we are rewrapping check that both keys are loaded */
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd->dd_parent);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
}
/* handle forcing an encryption root without rewrapping */
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
/* no other encryption params should be given */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that this is not an encryption root */
if (dd->dd_object == rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
}
/* crypt cannot be changed after creation */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* we are not inheritting our parent's wkey so we need one ourselves */
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check for a valid keyformat for the new wrapping key */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/*
* If this dataset is not currently an encryption root we need a new
* keylocation for this dataset's new wrapping key. Otherwise we can
* just keep the one we already had.
*/
if (dd->dd_object != rddobj && dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that the keylocation is valid if it is not NULL */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* passphrases require pbkdf2 salt and iters */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
} else {
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
}
/* make sure the dd's wkey is loaded */
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
/*
* This function deals with the intricacies of updating wrapping
* key references and encryption roots recursively in the event
* of a call to 'zfs change-key' or 'zfs promote'. The 'skip'
* parameter should always be set to B_FALSE when called
* externally.
*/
static void
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj,
uint64_t new_rddobj, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, boolean_t skip,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
zap_cursor_t *zc;
zap_attribute_t *za;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint64_t curr_rddobj;
ASSERT(RW_WRITE_HELD(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
/* hold the dd */
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, ddobj, NULL, FTAG, &dd));
/* ignore special dsl dirs */
if (dd->dd_myname[0] == '$' || dd->dd_myname[0] == '%') {
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return;
}
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
VERIFY(ret == 0 || ret == ENOENT);
/*
* Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root
* or if this dd is a clone.
*/
if (ret == ENOENT ||
(!skip && (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)))) {
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return;
}
/*
* If we don't have a wrapping key just update the dck to reflect the
* new encryption root. Otherwise rewrap the entire dck and re-sync it
* to disk. If skip is set, we don't do any of this work.
*/
if (!skip) {
if (wkey == NULL) {
VERIFY0(zap_update(dp->dp_meta_objset,
dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
&new_rddobj, tx));
} else {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, dd,
FTAG, &dck));
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
dsl_crypto_key_sync(dck, tx);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(dp->dp_spa, dck, FTAG);
}
}
zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP);
za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP);
/* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */
for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj);
zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
za->za_first_integer, new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
}
zap_cursor_fini(zc);
/*
* Recurse into all dsl dirs of clones. We utilize the skip parameter
* here so that we don't attempt to process the clones directly. This
* is because the clone and its origin share the same dck, which has
* already been updated.
*/
for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones);
zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
dsl_dataset_t *clone;
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, za->za_first_integer,
FTAG, &clone));
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, B_TRUE, tx);
dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG);
}
zap_cursor_fini(zc);
kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t));
kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t));
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
}
static void
spa_keystore_change_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
spa_t *spa = dp->dp_spa;
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL, *found_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t wkey_search;
char *keylocation = dcp->cp_keylocation;
uint64_t rddobj, new_rddobj;
/* create and initialize the wrapping key */
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &ds));
ASSERT(!ds->ds_is_snapshot);
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
/*
* We are changing to a new wkey. Set additional properties
* which can be sent along with this ioctl. Note that this
* command can set keylocation even if it can't normally be
* set via 'zfs set' due to a non-local keylocation.
*/
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
wkey->wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
} else {
keylocation = "prompt";
}
if (keylocation != NULL) {
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
keylocation, tx);
}
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj));
new_rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
} else {
/*
* We are inheritting the parent's wkey. Unset any local
* keylocation and grab a reference to the wkey.
*/
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa,
ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
}
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), ZPROP_SRC_NONE,
0, 0, NULL, tx);
rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir->dd_parent,
&new_rddobj));
}
if (wkey == NULL) {
ASSERT(dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY);
}
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* recurse through all children and rewrap their keys */
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, ds->ds_dir->dd_object,
new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
/*
* All references to the old wkey should be released now (if it
* existed). Replace the wrapping key.
*/
wkey_search.wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &wkey_search, NULL);
if (found_wkey != NULL) {
ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt));
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
}
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
} else if (wkey != NULL) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
}
int
spa_keystore_change_key(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp)
{
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t skcka;
/* initialize the args struct */
skcka.skcka_dsname = dsname;
skcka.skcka_cp = dcp;
/*
* Perform the actual work in syncing context. The blocks modified
* here could be calculated but it would require holding the pool
* lock and traversing all of the datasets that will have their keys
* changed.
*/
return (dsl_sync_task(dsname, spa_keystore_change_key_check,
spa_keystore_change_key_sync, &skcka, 15,
ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_RESERVED));
}
int
dsl_dir_rename_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *dd, dsl_dir_t *newparent)
{
int ret;
uint64_t curr_rddobj, parent_rddobj;
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (0);
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/*
* if this is not an encryption root, we must make sure we are not
* moving dd to a new encryption root
*/
if (dd->dd_object != curr_rddobj) {
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(newparent,
&parent_rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (parent_rddobj != curr_rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto error;
}
}
return (0);
error:
return (ret);
}
/*
* Check to make sure that a promote from targetdd to origindd will not require
* any key rewraps.
*/
int
dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin)
{
int ret;
uint64_t rddobj, op_rddobj, tp_rddobj;
/* If the dataset is not encrypted we don't need to check anything */
if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (0);
/*
* If we are not changing the first origin snapshot in a chain
* the encryption root won't change either.
*/
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
return (0);
/*
* If the origin is the encryption root we will update
* the DSL Crypto Key to point to the target instead.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
if (rddobj == origin->dd_object)
return (0);
/*
* The origin is inheriting its encryption root from its parent.
* Check that the parent of the target has the same encryption root.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin->dd_parent, &op_rddobj);
if (ret == ENOENT)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
else if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(target->dd_parent, &tp_rddobj);
if (ret == ENOENT)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
else if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
if (op_rddobj != tp_rddobj)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
return (0);
}
void
dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_sync(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
uint64_t rddobj;
dsl_pool_t *dp = target->dd_pool;
dsl_dataset_t *targetds;
dsl_dataset_t *originds;
char *keylocation;
if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return;
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
return;
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj));
if (rddobj != origin->dd_object)
return;
/*
* If the target is being promoted to the encryption root update the
* DSL Crypto Key and keylocation to reflect that. We also need to
* update the DSL Crypto Keys of all children inheritting their
* encryption root to point to the new target. Otherwise, the check
* function ensured that the encryption root will not change.
*/
keylocation = kmem_alloc(ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, KM_SLEEP);
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
dsl_dir_phys(target)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &targetds));
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
dsl_dir_phys(origin)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &originds));
VERIFY0(dsl_prop_get_dd(origin, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, keylocation, NULL, B_FALSE));
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(targetds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, keylocation, tx);
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(originds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_NONE, 0, 0, NULL, tx);
rw_enter(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, origin->dd_object,
target->dd_object, NULL, B_FALSE, tx);
rw_exit(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
dsl_dataset_rele(targetds, FTAG);
dsl_dataset_rele(originds, FTAG);
kmem_free(keylocation, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN);
}
int
dmu_objset_create_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *parentdd, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
boolean_t *will_encrypt)
{
int ret;
uint64_t pcrypt, crypt;
dsl_crypto_params_t dummy_dcp = { 0 };
if (will_encrypt != NULL)
*will_encrypt = B_FALSE;
if (dcp == NULL)
dcp = &dummy_dcp;
if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
if (parentdd != NULL) {
ret = dsl_dir_get_crypt(parentdd, &pcrypt);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
} else {
pcrypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
}
crypt = (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) ? pcrypt : dcp->cp_crypt;
ASSERT3U(pcrypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
ASSERT3U(crypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
/* check for valid dcp with no encryption (inherited or local) */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) {
/* Must not specify encryption params */
if (dcp->cp_wkey != NULL ||
(dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
strcmp(dcp->cp_keylocation, "none") != 0))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
return (0);
}
if (will_encrypt != NULL)
*will_encrypt = B_TRUE;
/*
* We will now definitely be encrypting. Check the feature flag. When
* creating the pool the caller will check this for us since we won't
* technically have the feature activated yet.
*/
if (parentdd != NULL &&
!spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
}
/* Check for errata #4 (encryption enabled, bookmark_v2 disabled) */
if (parentdd != NULL &&
!spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
SPA_FEATURE_BOOKMARK_V2)) {
return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
}
/* handle inheritance */
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
ASSERT3P(parentdd, !=, NULL);
/* key must be fully unspecified */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* parent must have a key to inherit */
if (pcrypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* check for parent key */
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(parentdd);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
return (0);
}
/* At this point we should have a fully specified key. Check location */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL ||
!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* Must have fully specified keyformat */
switch (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat) {
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_HEX:
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW:
/* requires no pbkdf2 iters and salt */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
break;
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE:
/* requires pbkdf2 iters and salt */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
break;
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE:
default:
/* keyformat must be specified and valid */
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
}
return (0);
}
void
dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd,
dsl_dataset_t *origin, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = dd->dd_pool;
uint64_t crypt;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
/* clones always use their origin's wrapping key */
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
ASSERT3P(dcp, ==, NULL);
/*
* If this is an encrypted clone we just need to clone the
* dck into dd. Zapify the dd so we can do that.
*/
if (origin->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
dd->dd_crypto_obj =
dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(origin->ds_dir, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1,
&dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
}
return;
}
/*
* A NULL dcp at this point indicates this is the origin dataset
* which does not have an objset to encrypt. Raw receives will handle
* encryption separately later. In both cases we can simply return.
*/
if (dcp == NULL || dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_RAW_RECV)
return;
crypt = dcp->cp_crypt;
wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
/* figure out the effective crypt */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT && dd->dd_parent != NULL)
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd->dd_parent, &crypt));
/* if we aren't doing encryption just return */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF || crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT)
return;
/* zapify the dd so that we can add the crypto key obj to it */
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
/* use the new key if given or inherit from the parent */
if (wkey == NULL) {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa,
dd->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
} else {
wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
}
ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL);
/* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */
dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj,
tx));
dsl_dataset_activate_feature(dsobj, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION,
(void *)B_TRUE, tx);
/*
* If we inherited the wrapping key we release our reference now.
* Otherwise, this is a new key and we need to load it into the
* keystore.
*/
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
} else {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey));
}
}
typedef struct dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg {
uint64_t dcrka_dsobj;
uint64_t dcrka_fromobj;
dmu_objset_type_t dcrka_ostype;
nvlist_t *dcrka_nvl;
boolean_t dcrka_do_key;
} dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t;
static int
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds,
dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
uint_t len;
uint64_t intval, nlevels, blksz, ibs;
uint64_t nblkptr, maxblkid;
if (ostype != DMU_OST_ZFS && ostype != DMU_OST_ZVOL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* raw receives also need info about the structure of the metadnode */
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", &intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", &intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CHECKSUM_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", &nlevels);
if (ret != 0 || nlevels > DN_MAX_LEVELS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", &blksz);
if (ret != 0 || blksz < SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
else if (blksz > spa_maxblocksize(tx->tx_pool->dp_spa))
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", &ibs);
if (ret != 0 || ibs < DN_MIN_INDBLKSHIFT || ibs > DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", &nblkptr);
if (ret != 0 || nblkptr != DN_MAX_NBLKPTR)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", &maxblkid);
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
/*
* Useraccounting is not portable and must be done with the keys loaded.
* Therefore, whenever we do any kind of receive the useraccounting
* must not be present.
*/
ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USERACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USEROBJACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
/*
* If we already created the objset, make sure its unchangeable
* properties match the ones received in the nvlist.
*/
rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
if (!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) &&
(mdn->dn_nlevels != nlevels || mdn->dn_datablksz != blksz ||
mdn->dn_indblkshift != ibs || mdn->dn_nblkptr != nblkptr)) {
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
}
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
/*
* Check that the ivset guid of the fromds matches the one from the
* send stream. Older versions of the encryption code did not have
* an ivset guid on the from dataset and did not send one in the
* stream. For these streams we provide the
* zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable to allow these datasets to
* be received with a generated ivset guid.
*/
if (fromds != NULL && !zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check) {
uint64_t from_ivset_guid = 0;
intval = 0;
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", &intval);
(void) zap_lookup(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID,
sizeof (from_ivset_guid), 1, &from_ivset_guid);
if (intval == 0 || from_ivset_guid == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISSING));
if (intval != from_ivset_guid)
return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISMATCH));
}
return (0);
}
static void
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dmu_objset_type_t ostype,
nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
zio_t *zio;
uint8_t *portable_mac;
uint_t len;
uint64_t compress, checksum, nlevels, blksz, ibs, maxblkid;
boolean_t newds = B_FALSE;
VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
/*
* Fetch the values we need from the nvlist. "to_ivset_guid" must
* be set on the snapshot, which doesn't exist yet. The receive
* code will take care of this for us later.
*/
compress = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress");
checksum = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum");
nlevels = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels");
blksz = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz");
ibs = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift");
maxblkid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid");
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &portable_mac,
&len));
/* if we haven't created an objset for the ds yet, do that now */
rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
if (BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) {
(void) dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(dp->dp_spa, ds,
dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds), ostype, nlevels, blksz,
ibs, tx);
newds = B_TRUE;
}
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
/*
* Set the portable MAC. The local MAC will always be zero since the
* incoming data will all be portable and user accounting will be
* deferred until the next mount. Afterwards, flag the os to be
* written out raw next time.
*/
arc_release(os->os_phys_buf, &os->os_phys_buf);
bcopy(portable_mac, os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
bzero(os->os_phys->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
os->os_next_write_raw[tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK] = B_TRUE;
/* set metadnode compression and checksum */
mdn->dn_compress = compress;
mdn->dn_checksum = checksum;
rw_enter(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_WRITER);
dnode_new_blkid(mdn, maxblkid, tx, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);
rw_exit(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock);
/*
* We can't normally dirty the dataset in syncing context unless
* we are creating a new dataset. In this case, we perform a
* pseudo txg sync here instead.
*/
if (newds) {
dsl_dataset_dirty(ds, tx);
} else {
zio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED);
dsl_dataset_sync(ds, zio, tx);
VERIFY0(zio_wait(zio));
/* dsl_dataset_sync_done will drop this reference. */
dmu_buf_add_ref(ds->ds_dbuf, ds);
dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx);
}
}
int
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
uint_t len;
uint64_t intval, key_guid, version;
boolean_t is_passphrase = B_FALSE;
ASSERT(dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT);
/*
* Read and check all the encryption values from the nvlist. We need
* all of the fields of a DSL Crypto Key, as well as a fully specified
* wrapping key.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, &intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS ||
intval <= ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, &intval);
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/*
* If this is an incremental receive make sure the given key guid
* matches the one we already have.
*/
if (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
if (intval != key_guid)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
}
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
&buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
&buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_IV_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_MAC_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/*
* We don't support receiving old on-disk formats. The version 0
* implementation protected several fields in an objset that were
* not always portable during a raw receive. As a result, we call
* the old version an on-disk errata #3.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, &version);
if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
is_passphrase = (intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE);
/*
* for raw receives we allow any number of pbkdf2iters since there
* won't be a chance for the user to change it.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
return (0);
}
void
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
uint_t len;
uint64_t rddobj, one = 1;
uint8_t *keydata, *hmac_keydata, *iv, *mac;
uint64_t crypt, key_guid, keyformat, iters, salt;
uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
char *keylocation = "prompt";
/* lookup the values we need to create the DSL Crypto Key */
crypt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE);
key_guid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID);
keyformat = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
iters = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
salt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
&keydata, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
&hmac_keydata, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &iv, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &mac, &len));
/* if this is a new dataset setup the DSL Crypto Key. */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
/* zapify the dsl dir so we can add the key object to it */
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
/* create the DSL Crypto Key on disk and activate the feature */
dd->dd_crypto_obj = zap_create(mos,
DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
dsl_dataset_activate_feature(ds->ds_object,
SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
ds->ds_feature[SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION] = (void *)B_TRUE;
/* save the dd_crypto_obj on disk */
VERIFY0(zap_add(mos, dd->dd_object, DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
/*
* Set the keylocation to prompt by default. If keylocation
* has been provided via the properties, this will be overridden
* later.
*/
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
keylocation, tx);
rddobj = dd->dd_object;
} else {
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj));
}
/* sync the key data to the ZAP object on disk */
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(mos, dd->dd_crypto_obj, crypt,
rddobj, key_guid, iv, mac, keydata, hmac_keydata, keyformat, salt,
iters, tx);
}
int
dsl_crypto_recv_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
dsl_dataset_t *ds = NULL, *fromds = NULL;
ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
FTAG, &ds);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
if (dcrka->dcrka_fromobj != 0) {
ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_fromobj,
FTAG, &fromds);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
}
ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(ds, fromds,
dcrka->dcrka_ostype, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
/*
* We run this check even if we won't be doing this part of
* the receive now so that we don't make the user wait until
* the receive finishes to fail.
*/
ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
out:
if (ds != NULL)
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
if (fromds != NULL)
dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
void
dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
FTAG, &ds));
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_ostype,
dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (dcrka->dcrka_do_key)
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
}
/*
* This function is used to sync an nvlist representing a DSL Crypto Key and
* the associated encryption parameters. The key will be written exactly as is
* without wrapping it.
*/
int
dsl_crypto_recv_raw(const char *poolname, uint64_t dsobj, uint64_t fromobj,
dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, boolean_t do_key)
{
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t dcrka;
dcrka.dcrka_dsobj = dsobj;
dcrka.dcrka_fromobj = fromobj;
dcrka.dcrka_ostype = ostype;
dcrka.dcrka_nvl = nvl;
dcrka.dcrka_do_key = do_key;
return (dsl_sync_task(poolname, dsl_crypto_recv_key_check,
dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync, &dcrka, 1, ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_NORMAL));
}
int
dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, uint64_t from_ivset_guid,
nvlist_t **nvl_out)
{
int ret;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
uint64_t rddobj;
nvlist_t *nvl = NULL;
uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj;
dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool;
objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
uint64_t crypt = 0, key_guid = 0, format = 0;
uint64_t iters = 0, salt = 0, version = 0;
uint64_t to_ivset_guid = 0;
uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
ASSERT(dckobj != 0);
VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
ret = nvlist_alloc(&nvl, NV_UNIQUE_NAME, KM_SLEEP);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* see zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable for errata info */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
&to_ivset_guid);
if (ret != 0)
ASSERT3U(dp->dp_spa->spa_errata, !=, 0);
/*
* We don't support raw sends of legacy on-disk formats. See the
* comment in dsl_crypto_recv_key_check() for details.
*/
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) {
dp->dp_spa->spa_errata = ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_6845_ENCRYPTION;
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
goto error;
}
/*
* Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did
* not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL
* Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we
* always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from
* the encryption root's key.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG);
ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
}
dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, key_guid);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, version);
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
raw_keydata, MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
raw_hmac_keydata, SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, iv,
WRAPPING_IV_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, mac,
WRAPPING_MAC_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac",
os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN));
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), format);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), iters);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), salt);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", mdn->dn_checksum);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", mdn->dn_compress);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", mdn->dn_nlevels);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", mdn->dn_datablksz);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", mdn->dn_indblkshift);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", mdn->dn_nblkptr);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", mdn->dn_maxblkid);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "to_ivset_guid", to_ivset_guid);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", from_ivset_guid);
*nvl_out = nvl;
return (0);
error_unlock:
dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
error:
if (rdd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
nvlist_free(nvl);
*nvl_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
uint64_t
dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(uint64_t crypt, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_crypto_key_t dck;
uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
uint64_t one = 1ULL;
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
ASSERT3U(crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
ASSERT3U(crypt, >, ZIO_CRYPT_OFF);
/* create the DSL Crypto Key ZAP object */
dck.dck_obj = zap_create(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
/* fill in the key (on the stack) and sync it to disk */
dck.dck_wkey = wkey;
VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_init(crypt, &dck.dck_key));
dsl_crypto_key_sync(&dck, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck.dck_key);
bzero(&dck.dck_key, sizeof (zio_crypt_key_t));
return (dck.dck_obj);
}
uint64_t
dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(dsl_dir_t *origindd, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, origindd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, 1, tx));
return (origindd->dd_crypto_obj);
}
void
dsl_crypto_key_destroy_sync(uint64_t dckobj, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
uint64_t refcnt;
/* Decrement the refcount, destroy if this is the last reference */
VERIFY0(zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &refcnt));
if (refcnt != 1) {
VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
-1, tx));
} else {
VERIFY0(zap_destroy(mos, dckobj, tx));
}
}
void
dsl_dataset_crypt_stats(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nv)
{
uint64_t intval;
dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
dsl_dir_t *enc_root;
char buf[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN];
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return;
intval = dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dd);
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS, intval);
if (dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd, &intval) == 0)
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION, intval);
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEY_GUID, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, ds->ds_object,
DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_IVSET_GUID, intval);
}
if (dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &intval) == 0) {
if (dsl_dir_hold_obj(dd->dd_pool, intval, NULL, FTAG,
&enc_root) == 0) {
dsl_dir_name(enc_root, buf);
dsl_dir_rele(enc_root, FTAG);
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_string(nv,
ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION_ROOT, buf);
}
}
}
int
spa_crypt_get_salt(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, uint8_t *salt)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Objset blocks are a special case for MAC generation. These blocks have 2
* 256-bit MACs which are embedded within the block itself, rather than a
* single 128 bit MAC. As a result, this function handles encoding and decoding
* the MACs on its own, unlike other functions in this file.
*/
int
spa_do_crypt_objset_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj,
abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
void *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
objset_phys_t *osp = buf;
uint8_t portable_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
uint8_t local_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* calculate both HMACs */
ret = zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
byteswap, portable_mac, local_mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
/* if we are generating encode the HMACs in the objset_phys_t */
if (generate) {
bcopy(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
bcopy(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
abd_return_buf_copy(abd, buf, datalen);
return (0);
}
if (bcmp(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0 ||
bcmp(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
}
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd,
uint_t datalen, uint8_t *mac)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint8_t *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
uint8_t digestbuf[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN];
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* perform the hmac */
ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
/*
* Truncate and fill in mac buffer if we were asked to generate a MAC.
* Otherwise verify that the MAC matched what we expected.
*/
if (generate) {
bcopy(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
return (0);
}
if (bcmp(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN) != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (ret);
}
/*
* This function serves as a multiplexer for encryption and decryption of
* all blocks (except the L2ARC). For encryption, it will populate the IV,
* salt, MAC, and cabd (the ciphertext). On decryption it will simply use
* these fields to populate pabd (the plaintext).
*/
int
spa_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, spa_t *spa, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb,
dmu_object_type_t ot, boolean_t dedup, boolean_t bswap, uint8_t *salt,
uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd,
boolean_t *no_crypt)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint8_t *plainbuf = NULL, *cipherbuf = NULL;
ASSERT(spa_feature_is_active(spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION));
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, zb->zb_objset, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
return (ret);
}
if (encrypt) {
plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(pabd, datalen);
cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf(cabd, datalen);
} else {
plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf(pabd, datalen);
cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(cabd, datalen);
}
/*
* Both encryption and decryption functions need a salt for key
* generation and an IV. When encrypting a non-dedup block, we
* generate the salt and IV randomly to be stored by the caller. Dedup
* blocks perform a (more expensive) HMAC of the plaintext to obtain
* the salt and the IV. ZIL blocks have their salt and IV generated
* at allocation time in zio_alloc_zil(). On decryption, we simply use
* the provided values.
*/
if (encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG && !dedup) {
ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv(iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
} else if (encrypt && dedup) {
ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(&dck->dck_key,
plainbuf, datalen, iv, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
}
/* call lower level function to perform encryption / decryption */
ret = zio_do_crypt_data(encrypt, &dck->dck_key, ot, bswap, salt, iv,
mac, datalen, plainbuf, cipherbuf, no_crypt);
/*
* Handle injected decryption faults. Unfortunately, we cannot inject
* faults for dnode blocks because we might trigger the panic in
* dbuf_prepare_encrypted_dnode_leaf(), which exists because syncing
* context is not prepared to handle malicious decryption failures.
*/
if (zio_injection_enabled && !encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_DNODE && ret == 0)
ret = zio_handle_decrypt_injection(spa, zb, ot, ECKSUM);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (encrypt) {
abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
} else {
abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
}
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (encrypt) {
/* zero out any state we might have changed while encrypting */
bzero(salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN);
bzero(iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN);
bzero(mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
} else {
abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
}
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
#if defined(_KERNEL)
module_param(zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check, int, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check,
"Set to allow raw receives without IVset guids");
#endif
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