356 lines
8.7 KiB
C
356 lines
8.7 KiB
C
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/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright 2013, Joyent, Inc. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.
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*
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* For Linux the vast majority of this enforcement is already handled via
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* the standard Linux VFS permission checks. However certain administrative
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* commands which bypass the standard mechanisms may need to make use of
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* this functionality.
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*/
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#include <sys/policy.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/vfs_compat.h>
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/*
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* The passed credentials cannot be directly verified because Linux only
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* provides and interface to check the *current* process credentials. In
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* order to handle this the capable() test is only run when the passed
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* credentials match the current process credentials or the kcred. In
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* all other cases this function must fail and return the passed err.
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*/
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static int
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priv_policy_ns(const cred_t *cr, int capability, boolean_t all, int err,
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struct user_namespace *ns)
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{
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ASSERT3S(all, ==, B_FALSE);
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if (cr != CRED() && (cr != kcred))
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return (err);
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_NS_CAPABLE)
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if (!(ns ? ns_capable(ns, capability) : capable(capability)))
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#else
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if (!capable(capability))
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#endif
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return (err);
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return (0);
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}
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static int
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priv_policy(const cred_t *cr, int capability, boolean_t all, int err)
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{
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return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, all, err, NULL));
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}
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static int
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priv_policy_user(const cred_t *cr, int capability, boolean_t all, int err)
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{
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/*
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* All priv_policy_user checks are preceeded by kuid/kgid_has_mapping()
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* checks. If we cannot do them, we shouldn't be using ns_capable()
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* since we don't know whether the affected files are valid in our
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* namespace. Note that kuid_has_mapping() came after cred->user_ns, so
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* we shouldn't need to re-check for HAVE_CRED_USER_NS
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*/
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, all, err, cr->user_ns));
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#else
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return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, all, err, NULL));
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Checks for operations that are either client-only or are used by
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* both clients and servers.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_nfs(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Catch all system configuration.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_sys_config(const cred_t *cr, boolean_t checkonly)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Like secpolicy_vnode_access() but we get the actual wanted mode and the
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* current mode of the file, not the missing bits.
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*
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* Enforced in the Linux VFS.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_access2(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner,
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mode_t curmode, mode_t wantmode)
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{
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* This is a special routine for ZFS; it is used to determine whether
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* any of the privileges in effect allow any form of access to the
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* file. There's no reason to audit this or any reason to record
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* this. More work is needed to do the "KPLD" stuff.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_any_access(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner)
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{
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if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
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return (0);
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if (zpl_inode_owner_or_capable(ip))
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return (0);
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
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return (EPERM);
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#endif
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if (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, B_FALSE, EPERM) == 0)
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return (0);
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if (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, B_FALSE, EPERM) == 0)
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return (0);
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return (EPERM);
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}
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/*
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* Determine if subject can chown owner of a file.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_chown(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
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{
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if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
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return (0);
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
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return (EPERM);
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#endif
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return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FOWNER, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Determine if subject can change group ownership of a file.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SETGID, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Policy determines whether we can remove an entry from a directory,
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* regardless of permission bits.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_remove(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FOWNER, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Determine that subject can modify the mode of a file. allzone privilege
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* needed when modifying root owned object.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_setdac(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
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{
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if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
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return (0);
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
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return (EPERM);
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#endif
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return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FOWNER, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Are we allowed to retain the set-uid/set-gid bits when
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* changing ownership or when writing to a file?
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* "issuid" should be true when set-uid; only in that case
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* root ownership is checked (setgid is assumed).
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*
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* Enforced in the Linux VFS.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(const cred_t *cr, boolean_t issuidroot)
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{
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Determine that subject can set the file setgid flag.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(const cred_t *cr, gid_t gid)
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{
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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if (!kgid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SGID_TO_KGID(gid)))
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return (EPERM);
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#endif
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if (crgetfsgid(cr) != gid && !groupmember(gid, cr))
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return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FSETID, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Determine if the subject can inject faults in the ZFS fault injection
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* framework. Requires all privileges.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_zinject(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, B_FALSE, EACCES));
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}
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/*
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* Determine if the subject has permission to manipulate ZFS datasets
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* (not pools). Equivalent to the SYS_MOUNT privilege.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_zfs(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, B_FALSE, EACCES));
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}
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void
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secpolicy_setid_clear(vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr)
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{
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if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0 &&
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secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(cr,
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(vap->va_mode & S_ISUID) != 0 &&
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(vap->va_mask & AT_UID) != 0 && vap->va_uid == 0) != 0) {
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vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
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vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Determine that subject can set the file setid flags.
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*/
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static int
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secpolicy_vnode_setid_modify(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
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{
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if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
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return (0);
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#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS) && defined(HAVE_KUID_HAS_MAPPING)
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if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
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return (EPERM);
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#endif
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return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FSETID, B_FALSE, EPERM));
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}
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/*
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* Determine that subject can make a file a "sticky".
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*
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* Enforced in the Linux VFS.
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*/
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static int
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secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (0);
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}
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int
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secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct inode *ip, vattr_t *vap,
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const vattr_t *ovap, cred_t *cr)
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{
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int error;
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if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISUID) != 0 &&
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(error = secpolicy_vnode_setid_modify(cr,
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ovap->va_uid)) != 0) {
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* Check privilege if attempting to set the
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* sticky bit on a non-directory.
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*/
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if (!S_ISDIR(ip->i_mode) && (vap->va_mode & S_ISVTX) != 0 &&
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secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(cr) != 0) {
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vap->va_mode &= ~S_ISVTX;
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}
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/*
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* Check for privilege if attempting to set the
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* group-id bit.
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*/
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if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISGID) != 0 &&
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secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(cr, ovap->va_gid) != 0) {
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vap->va_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Check privileges for setting xvattr attributes
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_xvattr(xvattr_t *xvap, uid_t owner, cred_t *cr, vtype_t vtype)
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{
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return (secpolicy_vnode_chown(cr, owner));
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}
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/*
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* Check privileges for setattr attributes.
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*
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* Enforced in the Linux VFS.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_vnode_setattr(cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, struct vattr *vap,
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const struct vattr *ovap, int flags,
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int unlocked_access(void *, int, cred_t *), void *node)
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{
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Check privileges for links.
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*
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* Enforced in the Linux VFS.
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*/
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int
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secpolicy_basic_link(const cred_t *cr)
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{
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return (0);
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}
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